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TERRITORIAL USE RIGHTS: A RIGHTS BASED
APPROACH TO SPATIAL MANAGEMENT
Keith R. Criddle, Mark Herrmann, and Joshua A. Greenberg

ABSTRACT

The advantages of increasingly fine scale management of fisheries may be offset by increased
enforcement and management costs, reduced catch-per-unit-effort and increased running costs for
harvesters, and by an intensification of the race for fish. An alternative to regulated open access
would be to lease or permanently transfer, spatially defined harvest privileges. Exclusive spatial
use privileges have been used to control grazing on public rangelands, and the exploitation of
forest, petroleum, and mineral resources on state and federal lands and on the submerged lands of
the outer continental shelf. Individual and community based spatial use privileges have been used
to stint access to fish and shellfish resources. This paper explores the potential economic and
management consequences of transferable and nontransferable, individual and community based
spatial use privileges in the context of the Aleutian Islands golden king crab (Lithodes
aequispinus) fishery .

TERRITORIAL USE RIGHTS: A RIGHTS BASED
APPROACH TO SPATIAL MANAGEMENT-:*Introduction

Participants in the Aleutian Islands golden king crab (Lithodes aequispinus) fishery have adopted a
pattern of spatial dispersion that reduces conflict and gear loss and has avoided excessive capitalization.
Currently, with relatively few participants and a large geographic region, it has been in each harvester's
interest to recognize others informal claims to exclusive rights to fish particular sites. However, recent
declines in the abundance of other regional crab stocks, expansion of pot fisheries for Pacific cod (Gadus
macrocephalus), the advent of pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) fishing cooperatives, and the imposition

of pot limits could increase the number of participants in the Aleutian Islands golden king crab fishery,
resulting in the collapse of informal agreements and an economically and ecologically wasteful race for
fish. This study provides an initial examination of the possible pitfalls and benefits of implementing a
more formal system of spatial-rights based management of the Aleutian Islands golden king crab fishery.
Spatial controls have long been a part of the management of living marine resources and have been
exercised over a wide range of scales. For example, coastal nations reserve to themselves authority over
access to marine resources within their territorial waters and extended jurisdictions. Although these
territorial claims are not coincident with the distribution of target species biomass where the claims
overlap or abut one another, or for highly migratory species, they have provided coastal nations the
possibility of controlling harvest effort and technology over much of the distribution of some stocks.
Spatial controls have often been applied at a fine scale for sessile stocks and to address concerns about
grounds congestion and localized depletion.
Spatial use privileges have been used to regulate utilization of a variety of publicly owned resources,
including timber production, grazing, and petroleum and other minerals extraction on state and federal
lands and on the outer continental shelf. The nature of the spatial use privilege has varied from seasonal or
annual use permits to long-term leases and even to fee simple title. For example concessionaires may be
awarded seasonal, annual, or multi-annual permits to supply campground, lodging, guiding, or other
services on public lands; fifty to one hundred year leases are not uncommon for timber and grazing rights;

':'Please direct all correspondence to Keith R. Criddle at the above address or at: (435) 797-2300 (voice), (435
797-2701 (fax), or kcriddle@econ.usu.edu (email).

and, under certain conditions, fee simple title is granted to lands claimed for homesteading or minerals
production. In general, the spatial use privilege has been an exclusive authorization to utilize a specific
resource in a specific region and has not been a right to exclude or block other resource uses. For
example, ranchers with federal grazing permits cannot control camping or hunting on leased lands.
Similarly, outer continental shelf petroleum leaseholders cannot control commercial or recreational
fishing in the waters above their leasehold. The extent to which spatial leaseholders husband their
resources and consider the effect of their actions on others depends on the security, duration, and
comprehensiveness of the right and the productivity of the resource.

**Territorial Use Rights In Fisheries (TURFs)
TURFs assign exclusive use privileges defined in terms of target fishery and location to an individual
or group (Christy, 1982). They are a special case of spatial harvest restrictions and have often been
applied in less industrialized and smaller-scale coastal fisheries where management has been based on
restricting participation to a localized population in a limited geographical area. Abalone (Haliotis sp.)
and other near shore fisheries in Japan are managed as spatially defined commons (Ruddle 1989). Some
near shore and fjord fisheries for Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in Northwest Norway reserve exclusive
territorial rights to littoral communities (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994). Similar rights have been
documented in Brazil (Cordell and McKean 1992), Chile (Gonzalez, 1996), Mesopotamia (Berkes, 1986),
and the Caribbean (Berkes, 1987). In some South Pacific cultures, the right to fish specific locations have
been further defined in terms of permissible fishing technology, target species, tide condition, and season
or time of day, with different rights in the same space being held by different individuals, families, or
social groups (Goodenough, 1951, 1963; Johannes, 1978; Carrier, 1987; Lieber, 1994). Exclusive use
rights to fishing sites and species were held by clans, tribes, and family groups in the Pacific Northwest
and Canada (Higgs, 1982; McEvoy, 1986; Bay-Hansen, 1991; Newell, 1993). Spatial rights to oyster

(Crassostrea virginica) beds have been subject to leasing in some states since the 18 th century (Agnello
and Donnelley, 1975; McCay, 1998). Acheson (1988) describes community based social structures that
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defend customary harvest areas for Maine lobster (Homarus americanus). Alaska's salmon
(Oncorhynchus sp.) and Pacific herring (Clupea pallasi) limited entry programs are managed under a

system of spatial-use privileges that have failed to eliminate the economically wasteful race for fish
(Schelle and Muse, 1986). The Local Area Management Plan (LAMP) for Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus
stenolepis) in Sitka Sound, Alaska (NPFMC, 1997) represents a common property TURF with access

restricted according to season, vessel size, and fishing purpose (commercial, charter, sport).

**Recent Economic Studies of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries

The traditional management approach for conserving stocks of Alaska's king (Para lith odes sp.,
Lithodes sp.), Tanner (Chionoecetes opilio), and snow crabs (C hairdi) has been to limit catch through

the "three S's": season, size, and sex. These instruments are used to achieve a target harvest rate set by
management. Other common controls used by management include restrictions on gear configuration,
area fished, gear deployed (e.g., pot limits), and adoption of population thresholds, which must be
maintained for the fishery to remain open. More recently, exclusive fishing zones, license limitations, and
vessel buybacks are being discussed and/or implemented. Several recent studies have examined the
effectiveness and efficiency of North Pacific crab management measures.
Greenberg and Herrmann (1994) examine the distributional consequence of pot limits in the Bristol
Bay red king (P. camtschaticus) crab fishery. They find that fixed pot limits (an upper limit on pots per
vessel) are relatively more disadvantageous to larger vessels with the result being a reallocation of harvest
and revenues from larger to smaller vessels. Moreover, because pot limits reduce entry costs, they may
induce additional vessels to enter the fishery. Greenberg et al. (1994) explore the potential economic
benefits of introducing a system of individual transferable pot quotas (ITPQs) in the Bristol Bay red king
crab and the Bering Sea snow crab fisheries. ITPQs are transferable rights to individual units of fishing
gear. Although restrictions on inputs only constrain output to the extent that there are few close input
substitutes, ITPQs enhance fishing effectiveness by allowing vessel operators to determine the optimal
number of pots that they fish. More efficient operators would buy pots from less efficient operators.

4

Harvesters who wished to exit the fishery, or to downsize, would receive compensation from those
wanting to enter the fishery or expand harvest, in other words, through voluntary market exchange.
However, because the total number of ITPQs would need to vary in response to population cycles, an
ITPQ system could involve considerable management costs for releasing additional ITPQs in times of
high abundance and retiring ITPQs in times of low abundance.
As an alternative to input controls, Lynch et al. (1996) explore the potential efficiency gains from
individual transferable quota (ITQ) management of the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery. In contrast to
ITPQs and other input control measures that indirectly influence output, ITQs restrict output directly. The
harvestable abundance of red king crab stocks is highly variable over time. Limited confidence in stock
models has led managers to favor a strategy of setting a preseason guideline harvest level (GHL) while
retaining the option of imposing an early closure if catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) declines. Similar
circumstances might arise in any fishery where management is highly dependent on fishery performance
data. Lynch et al. (1996) find that the presence of stock uncertainty reduces the potential efficiency gains
to ITQ management.
N atcher et al. (1996) examine the economic impacts of superexclusive vessel registration
management as applied to the Norton Sound red king crab fishery. Vessels that participate in
superexclusive crab fisheries are precluded from participating in other crab fisheries. Superexclusive
registration was adopted by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council in 1993, overturned by the
Secretary of Commerce, modified, readopted, and approved in 1994. Because participants in
superexclusive area registration fisheries must forgo participating in other (more lucrative) crab fisheries
during the same season, few large vessel operators choose to participate, effectively reserving the
superexclusive registration area for a local, small vessel fleet. Consequently, superexclusive area
registration is a form of common property TURF.
Herrmann et al. (1998) explore the potential consequences of applying pot limits to the Aleutian
Islands golden king crab fishery. They note that fishery participants have adopted a pattern of spatial
dispersion that reduces conflict and gear loss and has avoided excessive capitalization. However, they

5

find that imposition of pot limits could stimulate entry and collapse the informal TURFs, triggering an
economically and ecologically wasteful race for fish.

**The Aleutian Islands Golden King Crab Fishery

Aleutian Islands golden king crab fishery is jointly managed by the state and federal governments
through a cooperative fishery management plan (NPFMC, 1989). The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands
FMP (Fishery Management Plan) contains a general management goal to maximize the overall long-term
benefit to the nation of Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands stocks of king and Tanner crab by coordinated
federal and state management. Although the fishery occurs over an expansive geographic area (Figure 1),
fishing takes place on a limited set of narrow ledges and shelves (Figure 2). Currents can be extreme
throughout the fishing grounds and weather conditions are frequently severe.

CANADA
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Figure 1. Aleutian Islands king crab management area "0" and other management areas.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Aleutian Islands golden king crab harvests, 1997/98 season (Bowers, 1999).
Areas to the east and west of 174°W are managed with separate seasons and Guideline Harvest Limits. 1
Golden king crab molt throughout the year. Adults are found at varying depths, to 1,000 meters.
Although adult male crab are stratified by depth, that depth varies throughout the year (Blau et aI., 1996;
Bowers, 1999). Nevertheless, experienced fisherman can largely avoid juveniles, females, and molting
crabs. These conditions have led many participants to customize their gear and equipment. In contrast to
other Bering Sea crab fisheries that use individual pots, participants in the long-line Aleutian Island
golden king crab fishery typically use strings of 20 to 30 pots.
Fishery participants indicate that informal agreements exist among harvesters not to fish near each
other or to fish in regions where others have repeatedly harvested in prior seasons. This facilitates
harvesters being able to return seasonally to the same fishing grounds. The ability to retain and protect
fishing grounds is improved when the number of participants is low and when most are repeat
participants. The Aleutian Islands golden king crab fishery is small, both in terms of the number of
fishery participants (23 vessels) and total harvest (l.6 million crab) from the 1990/91 through 1997/98
fishing seasons.

I The boundary between east and west subregions has varied over time. The boundary was at 172°W from the 198 1182
through 1983/84 seasons, at 171 °W from 1984/85 through 1996/96, and at 174°W since 1996/97.
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In contrast with many other Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab fisheries, fishery performance
indicators suggest that the Aleutian Islands golden king crab stock is healthy and stable. Catch-per-uniteffort (CPUE) has averaged 8 crabs per potlift since the fishery's inception in 1981, with no statistically
significant differences between east and west regions and a small (-0.214 crabs per potlift per year) albeit
statistically significant (p-value = 0.0007) decline over time. The average weight of harvested crab has
not declined significantly (p-value = 0.327) since 1985/86 when the crab size limit was lowered from 6.5
to 6 inches (16.5 to 15.25 cm) carapace width. Similarly, in contrast to compressed seasons that
characterize other Bering Sea crab fisheries, openings in the Aleutian Islands golden king crab fishery
have increased to year-round in the western subarea and have averaged 106 days in the eastern region.
While we have not made an in-depth analysis of economic performance, a few features are prominent.
First, the inflation adjusted exvessel price of golden king crab has declined by an average of $0.10 per lb.
per year ($0.044 per kg per year). Second, the average number of potlifts per vessel has increased at a
statistically significant (p-value = lAE-09) rate of 499 lifts per year. As a consequence, the average real
revenue per potlift has declined at a statistically significant rate of -$8.20 per potlift per year (p-value <
0.0001) (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Average real exvessel revenue ($1992 base) per potlift in the eastern and western subregions of

the Aleutian Islands golden king crab fishery.
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However, the decrease in real exvessel revenue per potlift has been offset by an increase in the average
number of potlifts per vessel, so that inflation adjusted average exvessel revenue per vessel has been
relatively constant (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Average real exvessel revenue ($1992 base) per vessel in the eastern and western subregions of

the Aleutian Islands golden king crab fishery.
Because port and processing facilities lie eastward of the fishing grounds, running costs are higher for
vessels that fish further to the west. Moreover, because running costs are an important component of
variable costs, it would be expected that average revenue per potlift would increase from east to west at a
rate that approximately offsets the associated marginal increment to running costs. Consequently, in a
fishery characterized by open access behavior, effort would be expected to disperse to the west only when
average revenue per potlift declined in the easternmost fishing areas. That is, under open access, it is
expected that average net revenue (ex vessel revenue less variable costs) would be equated across fishing
areas. The absence of a clear pattern of east-to-west increasing revenues per potlift (Figure 5) suggests
that participants in this fishery have, in part, avoided dissipation of net revenues.
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Figure 5. Average revenue ($ 1992 base) per potlift by statistical reporting area in the Aleutian Islands
golden king crab fishery during the 1997/98 fishing season.

*Model
A simple discrete-time deterministic model can be used to characterize the bioeconornics of a system
of privately owned transferable TURFs. These leases could be permanent or temporary, with an initial
allocation based on participation history, lottery, or an auction. The profit-maximizing problem faced by
the i -th leaseholder is a constrained optimization described by

(1)

subject to
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

10

and non-negativity restrictions on If. , Pt, ht ,i, Cthlo,
, Ctdlo,
, at ,i, d t ,i, nt, Xt, and X t . The MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act constrains the control variable, h t (the sum of ht,i
across i), to values that will not reduce the future abundance of Aleutian Island golden king crab,
E ( Xt + k ) , below threshold levels predicated on the concept of maximum sustained yield.
Equation (1) maximizes the present value of net revenues to Aleutian Island golden king crab
harvesters. Net present value (NPVj) is the discounted sum of total revenues (Ptht,i) less operating costs
(cti)'

and territorial defense costs (C~i). The private discount rate If. reflects individual time preferences.

Although theoretical models consider values of 0 ::;

ri ::; 00 ,

empirical evidence suggests that the private

discount rate is approximated by the long-term corporate interest rate (0.10 ::; If. ::; 0.20). The variables
Pt

and ht,i are the real exvessel price and harvest, respectively in period t . The difference, T - to,

represents the duration of the TURF. Permanent ownership is a special case of the general model where

Equation (2) represents the population dynamics of Aleutian Islands golden king crab. Where Xt is
the current abundance of Aleutian Island golden king crab, Xt -k is the lagged abundance of Aleutian
Islands golden king crab, X t _ k is a vector of the lagged abundance of species that are related to Aleutian
Islands golden king crab through trophic or bycatch relationships in t - k ,and Yt-k is a vector of lagged
environmental variables. Aleutian Islands golden king crab abundance (Xt ) is assumed to be an
increasing (at a decreasing rate) function of the previous year's abundance of Aleutian Islands golden
king crab (Xt -1 ), a decreasing function of past harvests, and influenced by current and lagged
environmental conditions and the current and lagged abundance of other species through trophic or
8Xt

8 2 Xt

8Xt

8Xt-1

8x2
t -1

ht -1

8Xt

bycatch relationships. That is, - - > 0 , - - < 0 , and -8 -- < 0 ,whIle 8 '
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°

Xt-k

8 2 Xt
8Xt-18Xt-k

,

2
OXt ,and
0 Xt
could be positive or negative depending on the particular combination of
oYt-k
OXt-loYt-k

variables and lags.
The exvessel price formation process is represented by the vector equation (3). Exvessel price is
inversely dependent on the magnitude of harvests,

a:

t

uht

< 0, and influenced by a vector of other factors,

Wt , including inventories, exchange rates, income, and the price of substitutes. The influence of changes
in

Wt

on Pt depend on the particular element of

Wt .

Equation (4) represents variable harvesting costs (e:,i ). Harvesting costs are assumed to be a
decreasing function of abundance, and an increasing function of the magnitude of harvests, the distance of
the fishing area from port and processing facilities (dt,i ), and the number of participants (nt ). That is,

a

oe: i
Xt

< 0,

oe: i
8oe:ht,ii > 0, 8oe:dt,ii > 0, and a
> 0 . The first of these assumptions is motivated by the
nt

observation that CPUE rises as abundance increases, thus the cost per crab caught declines as abundance
rises. The second assumption states that catching more crab costs more money for any given level of
abundance. The third assumption reflects the contribution running costs make to harvest costs. Harvest
costs are assumed to increase as the number of participants increases and results in more frequent gear
interference, etc.
Equation (5) represents territorial defense costs (efi)'
, The magnitude of these enforcement costs
depends on the size of the TURFs ( at ,i), their remoteness (d t ,i ), and the number of fishery participants
( nt ). These costs could be borne by government (as they are under traditional management structures) or

by private individuals (as pollock and whiting allocations are enforced through private contracts within
the pollock and whiting coops). Although technological advances such as vessel and gear transponders
could change the structure these costs over time, it can be expected that enforcement costs are higher for
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large remote locations, particularly when there are a large number of participants (Anderson and Hill,

act· > 0, ~
act· > 0

1975). That is, ~
Uat,i

Udt,i

act·

and ~ >
Unt

o.

The profit-maximizing problem faced by fisheries managers is closely related to the problem faced by
individuals. Managers choose ht and nt to maximize

(1 ')

subject to constraints (2) through (5). The social discount rate, r, is usually assumed to be lower than the
private discount rate r;. .
Augmenting the objective functions with the constraints and solving the associated systems of firstorder conditions provides solutions that maximize the constrained private and social objective functions.
These solutions characterize the preferred number of fishers, harvest trajectory and corresponding stock,
price, and cost trajectories. (See e.g. Bj0rndal, 1988 and Criddle, 1993.)

*Results
While empirical data would be necessary to assess the magnitude of the net present value of
alternative TURF specifications, the model can suggest some of the theoretical consequences under
various conditions even without such data. The solution to equations (1) and (1') can be obtained by
forming Lagrangian functions that embed constraints (2) through (5).

(7)

(1')

Setting the derivatives of these Lagrangian functions with respect to the state (Xt ) and control variables

( ht, nt) and Lagrange multipliers (At) equal to zero, yields a set of necessary conditions for an optimum.
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For example, rearranging the derivative of the Lagrangian in equation (7) with respect to ht ,i yields

(8)

Equation (8) indicates that the shadow value (At ,i) of the resource to the i -th harvester in time t is the
discounted change in the i -th harvester's net revenue from an incremental change in their catch.
Substituting the relationship in equation (8) for the values of At,i in the derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to stock abundance and rearranging terms results in

(9)

Because

a (IIt,i )
a
= Pt
ht ,i

apt

acti

ht

ht ,i

a (IIt,i )

+ -a ht,i - - a 'a

ht -1 ,i

=

apt
a (IIt,i )
.
-a-- ht,i ,and a
= 0 , equatIOn (9) can be
ht -1
ht + k ,i

rewri tten as

(9')

Equation (9') indicates that the change in net revenue to the i -th fisher from a marginal increase in stock
abundance depends on the effect of last year's harvest on the current year's price and the product of
current marginal net revenues and the change in the rate of increase in abundance.
Because the change in net revenue to the i -th fisher from a marginal increase in stock abundance can
also be expressed as a function of changes in harvesting costs

(10)

the relationship in equation (9') can also be used to characterize the optimal stock trajectory. Combining
equations (9') and (10) yields
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which can be rewritten as

( 1 + 'l )

aITt .
,Z

aht - l ,i
aIT t ,Z·

a/x ( Xt-k, Xt-k, Yt-k )
aXt

aITt .

_ __,z

aXt

(11)

aht ,z·

Similar manipulations of the first order conditions from equation (7 '), the resource manager's
Lagrangian, result in

(12)

(13)

a/x (Xt-k, Xt-k, Yt-k )
aXt

(14)

Although actual behavior may differ from that implied by the theoretical model, the theoretical results
are indicative of inherent tendencies that could emerge if unchecked by social or regulatory constraints.
The specific design characteristics of the TURF system and the social and regulatory structure within
which it is embedded will determine the extent to which the following outcomes are realized. The results
can be summarized as:
1.

As the discount rate increases, that is as 'l

---+ 00 ,

the net present value of future benefits and

consequently the value of conserving the stock approaches zero. In other words, at high discount rates
fishers will have an increased incentive to maximize current harvests at the expense of future harvests.
This outcome holds even if the TURF is secure (T

---+ 00 )
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and the number of participants is low

(nt

1 ). Because the social rate of discount, r, is generally assumed to be less than the private discount

---+

rate, ri , private individuals have a somewhat higher incentive to deplete the stock. That is, in conditions
where rz

---+ 00,

TURF-leaseholders cannot be relied on to voluntarily adhere to a sustainable harvest

strategy.
2.

Short time horizons reduce the value of stock conservation to current TURF-leaseholders.

Myopic conditions can arise when the TURF is temporary and the lease expiration date approaches, that
is as t

---+

T , or even when T

---+ 00

if the TURF is non-transferable and the leaseholder approaches

retirement. The incentive to deplete the stock as t

---+

T can be reduced if current leaseholders are given

priority in the reallocation, particularly if the priority is conditional on the condition of the stock. Full
transferability would preclude myopic tendencies. Zero-revenue auctions (Tietenberg, 1995) and
overlapping lease renewals (Young, 1995) have been suggested as design criteria that offset myopia in
fixed duration permit systems. Note that the effective duration of the TURF could be affected by the
threat of fishery closure to provide marine protected areas, etc.
3.

Leaseholders have an incentive to exceed sustainable yields when the intrinsic rate of stock

increase is below the discount rate, aaXt

< rz , because the net present value of conserving the stock

Xt-l

approaches zero. This result holds even if the TURF is secure (T
low (nt

---+

---+ 00 )

and the number of participants is

1 ). That is, TURF-leaseholders cannot be relied on to voluntarily adhere to a sustainable

harvest strategy for a slow growing stock.
4.

Where harvest decisions within one harvest area are affected by harvesting in other harvest areas,

that is where there is significant larval dispersion or adult migration between TURFs, the abundance of
crab in area i is a lagged function of the harvest of crab in area j , therefore the opportunity cost of
foregoing current harvests is high and TURF-leaseholders have an increased incentive to exceed
sustainable yields within their areas. Because larval dispersion and adult migration rates depend on area
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size and location, the incentive to over harvest is increased if the number of participants (nt ) is large and
the average territory (at,i ) is small.
5. Where territorial boundaries are insecure, for example, when the boundaries are customary and
lack legal standing or where the cost of detecting border incursions are high, harvesters will have an
incentive to increase their level of capitalization to maximize their share of the allowable catch. That is,
there is a greater tendency towards over-capitalization in informal TURFs than in secure TURFs.
Similarly, there is a greater tendency towards over-capitalization in communally held TURFs than in
privately held TURFs. Alternatively, TURF-holders faced with porous territorial boundaries may choose
to exceed sustainable yields in an effort to capture the maximum possible value before their rivals capture
it. Measures that strengthen the delimitation of TURF boundaries, increase TURF size, restrict the
number of participants, or reduce detection and enforcement costs will increase the benefits to adhering to
sustained yield harvest limits and encourage a close matching of harvesting capacity with catch.
6.

For stocks with highly stochastic recruitment, particularly where recruitment success is largely

determined by exogenous environmental conditions, TURF-leaseholders the expected value for risk
averse leaseholders will be less than the mean harvest value. The effect is to increase 'l, thereby
decreasing the present value of future harvests and providing an increased incentive to harvest beyond
sustainable levels.
7.

Increases in the number of participants, particularly if the participants are heterogeneous,

decreases the present value of future harvests because of the larval dispersion and adult crab migration
effects described above, and because increased numbers of participants increase the cost of negotiating
and enforcing formal or informal agreements (Schlager, 1994).

*Discussion

The underlying cause of problems in open-access fisheries has been attributed to incompletely
specified property rights (Scott, 1996). ITPQs define rights to units of gear and as such, provide indirect
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control of harvests. However, ITPQs fail to address the externalities associated with gear conflict or stock
depletion. Moreover, while ITPQs block one avenue of over-capitalization, they leave open the possibility
of capital stuffing in unconstrained input factors. ITQs define rights to specific quantities (shares of the
Total Allowable Catch) of fish. While the ITQ may reduce the need to race for fish and associated
overcapitalization, there is still competition for preferred locations in the space-time commons. Moreover,
unless individuals hold large catch shares, they gain little individual benefit from stock conservation
because while they stand to reap immediate rewards from the sale of excessive catches, they share the
resultant adverse stock effects with all other quota holders.
TURFs provide an alternative specification of rights. Under a secure TURF management structure
with durable and transferable rights, harvesters will select efficient levels of capital investment, and, if the
rates of larval dispersion and adult migration between areas are low, they will internalize the benefits of
stock conservation. The ability to transfer spatial harvest use privileges ensures that those who wish to
exit the fishery are compensated for stock husbandry. Efficient harvesters could optimize the size of their
fishing operations by purchasing TURFs from less efficient operators and by adopting cost-minimizing
technologies. Transferability would also allow operators to adjust to changes in stock abundance, and
changes in product and input factor market equilibria. However, it may be rational for TURF-leaseholders
to deplete the target stock if the stock has low productivity or if there is a high level of uncertainty about
future stock abundance, price, or costs. Moreover, if the boundaries of the TURF are porous, that is if it is
difficult to control the number of participants, or if there is significant larval dispersion or adult migration,
there will be an increased incentive to deplete the stock. Finally, it should be noted that there are ways to
strengthen informal TURFs without creating formal property rights. For example, designating the
Aleutian Islands golden king crab fishery as a superexclusive management area might reduce the threat of
an influx of latent capacity, and thereby facilitate a continuation of the current informal arrangements
regarding customary fishing areas. Similarly, restrictive license limitation schema for the Bering Sea and
Aleutian Islands crab fleet would limit the pool of potential entrants into the Aleutian Islands area fishery.
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*Abstract
The advantages of increasingly fine scale management of fisheries may be offset by increased
enforcement and management costs, reduced catch-per-unit-effort and increased running costs for
harvesters, and by an intensification of the race for fish. An alternative to regulated open access would be
to lease or permanently transfer, spatially defined harvest privileges. Exclusive spatial use privileges have
been used to control grazing on public rangelands, and the exploitation of forest, petroleum, and mineral
resources on state and federal lands and on the submerged lands of the outer continental shelf. Individual
and community based spatial use privileges have been used to stint access to fish and shellfish resources.
This paper explores the potential economic and management consequences of transferable and nontransferable, individual and community based spatial use privileges in the context of the Aleutian Islands
golden king crab (Lithodes aequispinus) fishery.
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*Introduction
Participants in the Aleutian Islands golden king crab (Lithodes aequispinus) fishery have adopted a
pattern of spatial dispersion that reduces conflict and gear loss and has avoided excessive capitalization.
Currently, with relatively few participants and a large geographic region, it has been in each harvester's
interest to recognize others informal claims to exclusive rights to fish particular sites. However, recent
declines in the abundance of other regional crab stocks, expansion of pot fisheries for Pacific cod (Gadus

macrocephalus), the advent of pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) fishing cooperatives, and the
imposition of pot limits could increase the number of participants in the Aleutian Islands golden king crab
fishery, resulting in the collapse of informal agreements and an economically and ecologically wasteful
race for fish. This study provides an initial examination of the possible pitfalls and benefits of
implementing a more formal system of spatial-rights based management of the Aleutian Islands golden
king crab fishery.
Spatial controls have long been a part of the management of living marine resources and have been
exercised over a wide range of scales. For example, coastal nations reserve to themselves authority over
access to marine resources within their territorial waters and extended jurisdictions. Although these
territorial claims are not coincident with the distribution of target species biomass where the claims
overlap or abut one another, or for highly migratory species, they have provided coastal nations the
possibility of controlling harvest effort and technology over much of the distribution of some stocks.
Spatial controls have often been applied at a fine scale for sessile stocks and to address concerns about
grounds congestion and localized depletion.
Spatial use privileges have been used to regulate utilization of a variety of publicly owned resources,
including timber production, grazing, and petroleum and other minerals extraction on state and federal
lands and on the outer continental shelf. The nature of the spatial use privilege has varied from seasonal
or annual use permits to long-term leases and even to fee simple title. For example concessionaires may
be awarded seasonal, annual, or multi-annual permits to supply campground, lodging, guiding, or other
services on public lands; fifty to one hundred year leases are not uncommon for timber and grazing rights;
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